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Abstract
We study a variation of the Melitz (2003) model, a monopolistically competitive model with heterogeneity
in productivity across establishments and ﬁxed costs of exporting. We calibrate the model to match the
employment size distribution of US manufacturing establishments. Export participation in the calibrated
model is then compared to the data on US manufacturing exporters. With ﬁxed costs of starting to export
about 3.9 times as large as costs of continuing as an exporter, the model can match both the size distribution
of exporters and transition into and out of exporting. The calibrated model is then used to estimate the
eﬀect of reducing tariﬀs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We ﬁnd sizeable gains to moving to free
trade. Contrary to the view that the gains to lowering tariﬀs are larger in models with export decisions, we
ﬁnd that steady state consumption increases by less in our benchmark model of exporting than in a similar
model without ﬁxed costs. However, we also ﬁnd that comparisons of steady state consumption understate
the welfare gains to trade reform in models with ﬁxed costs and overstate the welfare gains in models without
ﬁxed costs. With ﬁxed costs, tariﬀs lead to an overaccumulation of product varieties which can be used
more eﬀectively along the transition to the new steady state. Thus, following trade liberalizations economic
activity overshoots its steady state, with the peak in output coming 10 years after the trade reform. Finally,
we explore the impact of the key modelling assumptions in the theoretical literature for quantitative results.
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Recent evidence of substantial diﬀerences between exporters and non-exporters has led Melitz
(2003) to develop a theory of international trade that emphasizes productive heterogeneity across
many monopolistically competitive establishments facing ﬁxed costs of exporting. This theory is
consistent with the evidence that the biggest, most productive establishments do the bulk of ex-
porting and empirical estimates of large ﬁxed costs of exporting (Das, Roberts and Tybout 2007).
In this theory, tariﬀs and trade barriers reduce the value of exporting and thus discourage some rel-
atively productive establishments from paying the ﬁxed cost and exporting. This lowers trade ﬂows
and shifts production away from relatively productive establishments toward relatively unproductive
non-exporters. Reducing tariﬀs encourages entry into export markets by relatively productive estab-
lishments and reallocates production toward these relatively productive exporters. Melitz (2003),
Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Alvarez and Lucas (2006) emphasize that this reallocation increases
the welfare gains to lowering trade barriers compared to models without this margin.1 In this paper,
we evaluate the impact of lowering tariﬀs on welfare and trade in a particular variation of the Melitz
model.
Before examining the aggregate implications of trade reform, our ﬁrst goal is to ﬁnd out
whether the cross-plant distribution of export participation and transitions into and out of export-
ing generated by a model with ﬁxed costs of exporting are consistent with the data. To do this, we
make two modiﬁcations to the Melitz model to allow for richer establishment and exporter dynam-
ics.2 First, we subject plants to persistent, idiosyncratic technology shocks. Second, consistent with
the evidence of Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007), we assume individual establishments face a large,
1The Eaton and Kortum (2002) model is a multicountry version of the Dornbusch-Fisher-Samuelson model with a
continuum of goods and idiosyncratic diﬀerences across producers. The model is competitive and has no ﬁxed costs
of trade.
2Atkeson and Burstein (2006) develop a model of ﬁrm dynamics to study the relation between innovation and
trade.
1up-front sunk cost of entering a foreign market and a smaller, period-by-period cost of continuing in
that market. In the presence of idiosyncratic technology shocks, nonexporting establishments start
exporting only when the expected value of exporting covers the entry costs. Exporters continue to
export as long as the value of doing so exceeds the continuation cost. This generates what Baldwin
and Krugman (1989) call exporter hysteresis in that establishments continue to export even after
their production costs have risen far above the levels that led them to start exporting. Exporter
hysteresis implies that some relatively unproductive establishments export and some relatively pro-
ductive establishments sell at only home, and it is important in getting the model to match the
dispersion in export participation among US manufacturing establishments in the data.
Since the model can generate exporter characteristics and movements into and out of export-
ing that match US manufacturing plant-level data, our second goal is to use the calibrated model to
see how tariﬀsa ﬀect entry, export participation, trade, and welfare. We ﬁnd that a global reduction
of tariﬀs from 8 percent to free trade increases the total number of tradable varieties available by
13 percent but lowers the number of non-tradable varieties by 0.5 percent. The increase in tradable
varieties is a result of a 1.9 percent fall in the number of domestic tradable establishments and
a near doubling of export participation from 22.3 percent of establishments to 41.3 percent. The
duration of each exporting spell rises from 5.9 years3 to 10 years. In total, the model predicts an
82 percent increase in trade. These changes in export participation and establishments result in a
sizeable 1.07 percent rise in steady state consumption. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we ﬁnd that
consumption rises by substantially less in our model of exporting than a similar model without the
export margin. We view this result as sensible. Aft e ra l l ,i nt h em o d e lw i t ha ne x p o r td e c i s i o nt h e r e
is one additional margin to adjust economic activity than the model in which all establishments
export.
3This is calculated as the inverse of the annual rate of exit from exporting.
2Our dynamic model is also well suited to study the transition dynamics following an unan-
ticipated move to free trade. Considering these transitions, we ﬁnd that steady state consumption
understates the welfare gain by almost 15 percent, since along the transition to the new steady state
the economy overshoots considerably, with consumption peaking 10 years after the reform at 0.3
percent above its long-run level. The boom in economic activity occurs because tariﬀsl e a dt ot h e
creation of too many establishments and not enough exporters. When tariﬀs are lowered, existing
establishments can now be used eﬀectively to produce new varieties by incurring the startup export
cost. In addition, current exporters, which have already incurred the big startup cost, ﬁnd it worth-
while to continue exporting longer and thus the return on that past investment in export capacity
increases. Both margins allow the investment embodied in existing establishments and exporters to
be used more eﬀectively.
Our ﬁnal goal is to provide some guidance to modelers of the quantitative implications of
some common modelling assumptions. By changing certain parameters in our benchmark model
we can study the role of four common assumptions: no capital, identical startup and continuation
export costs, permanent idiosyncratic productivity, and no intermediate inputs. First, we ﬁnd that
abstracting from capital accumulation lowers the welfare gain to moving to free trade by about one-
quarter, but has no noticeable impact on either export participation or trade ﬂows. Without capital
the economic expansion following a trade liberalization is much more muted, with output peaking 6
years earlier and about 23 percent below the peak in the benchmark model, as capital is useful for
smoothing out the beneﬁts of trade liberalization. Second, we ﬁnd that the structure of ﬁxed costs
matters for both the trade and export participation response to tariﬀs but less so for welfare. When
the startup cost is constrained to be the same as the continuation cost of exporting, the trade and
export participation increase is, respectively, 12 and 25 percent less than in the benchmark model.
The alternate model generates a smaller response of trade and exporting because the threshold for
3entry and exit is identical and there are fewer establishments aﬀected by changes in this threshold
than in the benchmark model. Third, we ﬁnd that the structure of idiosyncratic shocks matters
for both welfare and trade. When establishment productivity is constant, we ﬁnd that steady
state consumption overstates the welfare gains to free trade as the model does not generate any
overshooting along the transition. Additionally, the increase in trade and export participation is
less than in our benchmark model. Finally, we ﬁnd the welfare results are quite sensitive to the use
of intermediate inputs in the production of tradable varieties. Without intermediates, the welfare
gains to trade reform are about 20 percent of our benchmark model.
This paper is related to three lines of research. First, our focus on the welfare gains to
trade liberalization is similar to the work by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen
and Kortum (2003) and Alvarez and Lucas (2006). These papers evaluate the welfare gains to
trade liberalization in static, multicountry Ricar d i a nm o d e l sw i t hp r o d u c t i vity heterogeneity, tariﬀs,
and transportation costs. Unlike these papers, we consider a dynamic model with entry and exit
subject to ﬁxed costs and allow for capital accumulation under a monopolistically competitive market
environment. Chaney (2005) discusses the dynamics of trade and establishment dynamics following
trade liberalization in the Melitz model.4 The second line of research uses models with ﬁxed costs
of trade to understand international business cycle ﬂuctuations (see Ruhl (2003), Alessandria and
Choi (2007), and Ghironi and Melitz (2005)). Finally, there is a third, partial equilibrium literature
that studies the export decisions of establishments. Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989)
develop models of export decisions with an exogenous exchange rate process. Das, Roberts and
Tybout (2007) develop these models further and use them to estimate the sunk costs of exporting.
As partial equilibrium studies these papers cannot evaluate welfare.
4Baldwin and Forslid (2006) discuss the welfare gains to trade reform in the Melitz model. They point out that
trade reform may result in a reduction in the number of varieties available. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2005) discuss
the growth implications in the Melitz model.
4The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a two-country dynamic general
equilibrium model with endogenous export penetration and sunk costs of exporting. Section 3 dis-
cusses the calibration of the model and the distribution of establishments and export participation.
Section 4 discusses the relationship between tariﬀs, exporter characteristics, trade and welfare in
the steady state of the model. In Section 5 we examine the transition dynamics following an unan-
ticipated worldwide elimination of tariﬀs. In Section 6, we investigate how the quantitative results
are sensitive to alternative structures of models. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
In this section, we develop a model that contains the key features of the Melitz model,
producer heterogeneity and ﬁxed costs of exporting.5 Each period there is a mass of existing
establishments distributed over sectors, productivity, countries, and export status. Productivity
is stochastic and generates movements of establishments into and out of exporting. Unproductive
establishments also shutdown, and new establishments are created by incurring a sunk cost.
There are two countries, home and foreign. Each country is populated by a continuum of
identical, inﬁnitely lived consumers with mass of one. Each period, consumers are endowed with
ﬁxed L units of labor and supply them inelastically in the labor market.
In each country there are two intermediate good sectors, tradable and non-tradable. In each
sector, there is a large number of monopolistically competitive establishments, each producing a
diﬀerentiated good. The mass of varieties in the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors are NT,t
and NN,t, respectively. A non-tradable good producer uses capital and labor inputs to produce its
variety, whereas a tradable good producer uses capital, labor, and material inputs to produce its
variety.6 In each sector, establishments diﬀer in terms of total factor productivity, capital, and the
5Unlike the Melitz model we do not have ﬁxed costs of continuing to produce. Instead, we capture the higher exit
rates of small establishments in the shock process we consider.
6We introduce materials into the tradable sector to be consistent with the observation that trade as a share of gross
5markets they serve.
All establishments sell their product in their own country, but only some establishments
in the tradable good sector export their goods abroad. When an establishment in the tradable
good sector exports goods abroad, the establishment incurs some international trading cost. The
establishment has to pay tariﬀs to the government of the destination country with an ad valorem
tariﬀ rate of τ in addition to an ad valorem transportation cost with the rate of ξ.7 Additionally, the
establishment has to pay some ﬁxed costs to export its goods abroad. The size of the cost depends
on the producer’s export status in the previous period. There is a (relatively) high up-front sunk
cost f0 > 0 that must be borne to gain entry into the export market next period. In subsequent
periods, to continue exporting in the following period, establishments incur a lower but nonzero
period-by-period ﬁxed continuation cost f1 <f 0. If an establishment does not pay this continuation
cost, then it ceases to export. In future periods, the establishment can begin exporting only by
incurring the entry cost f0 again. These costs are valued in units of labor in the domestic country.
The cost of exporting implies that the set of goods available to consumers and establishments diﬀers
across countries and is changing over time. We assume that the ﬁxed costs must be incurred in the
period prior to exporting. This implies that the set of foreign varieties is ﬁx e da tt h es t a r to fe a c h
period. All the establishments are owned by domestic consumers.
Any potential establishment can enter either the tradable or non-tradable sector by hiring
fE domestic workers. New entrants can actively produce goods and sell their products from the
following period on.
Establishments diﬀer by their technology, export status, sector, and nationality. The measure
of home country tradable establishments with technology z and export status, m =1for exporters
output is considerably smaller than trade as a share of value-added.
7The transportation costs are ‘iceberg’. For one unit of good to be arrived at destination, 1+ξ units should be
shipped.
6and m =0for non-exporters, equals ϕT,t(z,m). The measure of home country non-tradable es-
tablishments with technology z equals ϕN,t(z). The distribution of establishments over technology,
exporting status and sector are part of the aggregate state variable. We ﬁnd the evolution of this
distribution is central to the quantitative results.
In each country, competitive ﬁnal goods producers purchase intermediate inputs from those
establishments actively selling in that country.8 The cost of exporting implies that the set of
goods available to competitive ﬁnal goods producers diﬀers across countries. The entry and exit
of exporting establishments implies that the set of intermediate goods available in a country is
changing over time. The ﬁnal goods are used for both domestic consumption and investment.
In this economy, there exists a one-period single nominal bond denominated in the home
currency. Let Bt denote the home consumer’s holding of the bonds purchased in period t.L e tB∗
t
denotes the foreign consumer’s holding of this bond. The bond pays 1 unit of home currency in
period t +1 .L e tQt denote the nominal price of the bond Bt.
A. Consumers
Home consumers choose consumption, investment, and bond holdings to maximize their
utility:




subject to the sequence of budget constraints,
PtCt + PtKt + QtBt ≤ PtWtLt + PtRtKt−1 +( 1− δ)PtKt−1 + Bt−1 + PtΠt + PtTt,
8Final good production technology does not require capital or labor inputs. The ﬁnal good production technology
regulates a country’s preferences over local and imported varieties.
7where β is the subjective time discount factor with 0 <β<1; Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good;
Ct is the consumption of ﬁnal goods; Kt−1 is the capital available in period t; Qt and Bt are the
price of bonds and the bond holdings; Wt and Rt denote the real wage rate and the rental rate of
capital; δ is the depreciation rate of capital; Πt is the sum of real dividends from the home country’s
producers; and Tt is the real lump-sum transfer from the home government.
The problem of foreign consumers is analogous to this problem. Prices and allocations in the
foreign country are represented with an asterisk. Money has no role in this economy and is only a


























where ∗ denotes the foreign variables and et is the nominal exchange rate with home currency as
numeraire.9







where UC,t denotes the derivative of the utility function with respect to its argument. The price of
the bond is standard. From the Euler equations of two countries, we have the growth rate of the










9An increase in et means a depreciation of domestic currency.
8B. Final Good Producers
I nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,ﬁnal goods are produced using only home and foreign intermediate
goods. A ﬁnal good producer can purchase from any of the home intermediate good producers but
can purchase only from those foreign tradable good producers that are actively selling in the home
market.
The production technology of the establishment is given by a Cobb-Douglas function for
tradable and non-tradable aggregate inputs, DT,t and DN,t, with the tradable share γ





where Dt is the output of ﬁnal goods and DT,t and DN,t are the aggregates of tradable and non-
tradable goods, respectively. The aggregation technology of the establishment is given by a constant


































N,t(z) are inputs of intermediate goods purchased from a home
tradable good producer with technology z and export status m, foreign tradable exporter with
technology z, and home non-tradable good producer with technology z, respectively. The elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods within a sector is θ.
The ﬁnal goods market is competitive. Given the ﬁnal good price at home Pt, the prices
charged by each type of tradable and non-tradable good, the ﬁnal good producer solves the following
9problem






























































































The ﬁnal goods are used for both consumption and investment.
C. Intermediate Good Producers
All the intermediate good producers produce their diﬀerentiated good using capital, labor
and material inputs. We assume that an incumbent’s productivity, z,f o l l o w saﬁrst order Markov
10Notice that the production function is deﬁned only over the available products. It is equivalent to deﬁne the
production function over all possible varieties but constrain purchases of some varieties to be zero.
10process with a transition probability φ(z0|z), the probability that the productivity of the estab-
lishment will be z0 in the next period conditional on its current productivity z, provided that the
establishment survived. An entrant draws productivity next period based on φE (z0).W e a l s o
assume that establishments receive an exogenous death shock that depends on a establishment’s
productivity, z,a tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d ,0 ≤ nd (z) ≤ 1.
Non-Tradable Good Producers
Consider the problem of a non-tradable good producer from the home country in period t
with technology z. The producer chooses the current price PN,t(z), inputs of labor lN,t(z) and





















yN,t(z) − WtlN,t(z) − RtkN,t(z) (13)
subject to the production technology (11), and the constraints that supplies to the non-tradable
goods market yN,t(z) are equal to demands by ﬁnal good producers yd
N,t(z) in (7).
Tradable Good Producers
A producer in the tradable good sector is described by its technology and export status,
(z,m). Each period, it chooses current prices PH,t (z,m) and P∗
H,t (z,m), and inputs of labor
lT,t(z,m), capital kT,t(z,m), materials xt (z,m), and next period’s export status, m0. Total mate-



























F,t(ζ,1,z,m) are inputs of intermediate goods purchased from a home
tradable good producer with technology ζ and export status μ, and foreign tradable exporter with
technology ζ, respectively, by the tradable good producer with technology z and export status m.





















given the prices and the choice of the aggregate material input, xt (z,m).
























































12subject to the production technology (11) and the constraints that supplies to home and foreign
tradable goods markets, yH,t (z,m) and y∗
H,t (z,m) with yT,t(z,m)=yH,t (z,m)+(1+ξ)y∗
H,t (z,m),




























Let the value of the producer with z if it decides to export in period t +1be
V 1













and let the value if it does not export in period t be
(24) V 0















































13Clearly the value of a producer depends on its export status and is monotonically increasing and
continuous in z given m, and the states of the world. Moreover V 1
T intersects V 0
T from below
as long as there are some establishments that do not export.11 Hence, it is possible to solve for
the establishment productivity at which an establishment is indiﬀerent between exporting or not
exporting; that is, the increase in establishment value from exporting equals the cost of exporting.
This level of establishment productivity diﬀers by the establishment’s current export status. The
critical level of technology for exporters and non-exporters, z1,t and z0,t,s a t i s f y
V 1
T,t(z1,t,1) = V 0
T,t(z1,t,1), (26)
V 1
T,t(z0,t,0) = V 0
T,t(z0,t,0). (27)
D. Entry
Each period, a new establishment can be created by hiring fE workers. New establishments
can enter either the tradable or non-tradable sector. Establishments incur these entry costs in the
period prior to production. Once the entry cost is incurred, establishments receive an idiosyncratic
productivity shock from the distribution φE (z0). All the entrants are free from death shocks. New
entrants into the tradable sector can not export in their ﬁrst productive period. Thus the entry
conditions in two sectors are given as
V E











dz0 ≥ 0, (28)
V E









dz0 ≥ 0. (29)
Let the mass of entrants in the tradable and non-tradable good sectors who pay the entry
cost in period t be NTE,t and NNE,t, while the mass of incumbents in the tradable and non-tradable
11If the diﬀerence between f0 and f1 is relatively large, the economy may have V
1 >V
0 for all z ∈ (−∞,∞) for
some periods.









and the mass of establishments in the tradable good sector is given as
(32) NT,t = N1,t + N0,t.
The ﬁxed costs of exporting imply that only a fraction nx,t = N1,t/NT,t of home tradable goods are
available in the foreign country in period t.





Given the critical level of technology for exporters and non-exporters, z1,t and z0,t, we can measure









































































The government collects tariﬀs from foreign exporters and equally distributes the tariﬀ rev-
enue to domestic consumers each period. The government’s budget constraint is given as










The investment, It, is given by the law of motion for capital
(37) It = Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1.














respectively. Nominal GDP of the home country is deﬁned as the sum of value added from non-
16tradable, tradable and ﬁnal goods producers,
Y N
t = PtDt + EXN
t − IMN
t .


















The domestic labor12 hired by exporters, LX,t, is given by







From (42), we see that the trade cost, measured in units of domestic labor, depends on the exporter
status from the previous period.
Aggregate proﬁts are measured as the diﬀerence between proﬁts and ﬁxed costs and equal









−WtLX,t − fEWt (NTE,t+ NNE,t).
For each type of good, there is a distribution of establishments in each country. For the sake
of exposition we have written these distributions separately by country and type of establishment.
It is also possible to rewrite the world distribution of establishments over types as ϕ : R ×{ 0,1}×
12Entry costs are measured in units of labor to ensure a balanced growth path.
17{H,F}×{T,NT}, where now we have indexed establishments by their origin and their sector. The
exogenous evolution of establishment technology as well as the endogenous export participation and
entry decisions determines the evolution of this distribution. The law of motion for this distribution
is summarized by the operator T, which maps the world distribution of establishments and entrants
into the next period’s distribution of establishments,




In an equilibrium, variables satisfy several resource constraints. The ﬁnal goods market
clearing conditions are given by Dt = Ct + It, and D∗
t = C∗
t + I∗
t . Each individual goods market
clears; the labor market clearing conditions are L = LP,t+LX,t+fE (NTE,t+ NNE,t), and the foreign






z kN,t(z)ϕN,t(z)dz, and the foreign analogue. The government budget constraint is given by (36)
and the foreign analogue. The proﬁts of establishments are distributed to the shareholders, Πt,a n d
the foreign analogue. The international bond market clearing condition is given by Bt + B∗
t =0 .
Finally, our decision to write the budget constraints in each country in units of the local currency
permits us to normalize the price of consumption in each country as Pt = P∗
t =1 .
An equilibrium of the economy is a collection of allocations for home consumers Ct,B t,K t;
allocations for foreign consumers C∗
t ,B ∗
t ,K ∗
t ; allocations for home ﬁnal good producers; allocations
for foreign ﬁnal good producers; allocations and prices for home non-tradable good producers; allo-
cations and prices for foreign non-tradable good producers; allocations, prices, and export policies
for home tradable good producers; allocations, prices and export decisions for foreign tradable good
producers; labor used for exporting costs at home and foreign; labor used for entry costs; transfers Tt,
T∗
t by home and foreign governments; real wages Wt, W∗
t , real rental rates of capital Rt,R ∗
t,r e a la n d
18nominal exchange rates qt and et; and bond prices Qt that satisfy the following conditions: (i) the
consumer allocations solve the consumer’s problem; (ii) the ﬁnal good producers’ allocations solve
their proﬁt maximization problems; (iii) the non-tradable good producers’ allocations and prices
solve their proﬁt maximization problems; (iv) the tradable good producers’ allocations, prices, and
export decisions solve their proﬁt maximization problems; (v) the entry conditions for tradable and
non-tradable sectors hold; (vi) the market clearing conditions hold; and (vii) the transfers satisfy
the government budget constraint.
3. Calibration
We now describe the functional forms and parameter values of our benchmark economy. The
parameter values used in the simulation exercises are reported in Table 1.





where 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The establishment size distribution is largely determined by the underlying structure of
shocks. An incumbent’s productivity follows
z0 = ρlnz + ε, ε
iid ∼ N(0,σ2
ε).
The assumption that establishment technology follows an AR(1) with shocks drawn from an iid






. We assume that entrants draw productivity based on the unconditional distribution









19However, to match the observation that entrants start out small relative to incumbents we assume
that μE < 0. We also assume that establishments receive an exogenous death shock that depends
on an establishment’s last period productivity, z, so that the probability of death is given as








The choice of the discount factor, β, t h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n ,δ, and risk-aversion, σ, is
standard in the literature, β =0 .96,δ=0 .10, and σ =2. The labor supply is normalized to L =1 .
The parameter θ determines both the producer’s markup as well as the elasticity of substitu-
tion across varieties. We set θ =5 , which gives the producer’s markup of 25 percent. This value of θ
is consistent with the US trade-weighted import elasticity of 5.36 estimated by Broda and Weinstein
(2006) for the period 1990-2001.13 Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) summarize measures of tariﬀ
and non-tariﬀ barriers. For industrialized countries, tariﬀ barriers are approximately 5 percent while
non-tariﬀ barriers are about 8 percent.14 We set the tariﬀ rate to 8 percent, near the midpoint of
the sum of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers. The transportation cost parameter, ξ, is set to match the
exporters’ export sales to the total sales ratio of 13.3 percent from the 1992 Census of Manufactures.
Given the tariﬀ rate and elasticity of substitution, this implies ξ =0 .451. In total, our calibration
implies that tariﬀs and transportation costs increase the per unit cost by 57 percent. Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) ﬁnd slightly larger costs of 65 percent (excluding distribution/retail costs), but
their measure includes the trade distortions from ﬁxed costs.
The tradable share parameter of the ﬁnal good producer, γ, is set to 0.21 to match the ratio
of manufacturers’ nominal value-added relative to private industry GDP excluding agriculture and
13Anderson and van Wincoop survey elasticity estimates from bilateral trade data and conclude θ ∈ [5,10].
14Tariﬀ measures can vary. For instance, Yi (2003) reports a tariﬀ on manufactured goods of 4.5 percent in the
US in 1992. Similarly, US tariﬀ revenue in 1992 was equl to 3.3 percent of imports. The World Bank reports an
unweighted average tariﬀ of 6.4 percent. For comparison Alvarez and Lucas (2006) calibrate their model to 11 percent
tariﬀs.
20mining for the US from 1987 to 1992. The labor share parameter in the production, α, is set to
match the labor income to GDP ratio of 66 percent. The share of materials in production, αx,
determines the ratio of gross output to value-added in manufacturing. For the period 1987 to 1992,
in the US this ratio averages 2.75 and implies that αx =0 .804.
The total mass of establishments, NT,t + NN,t, is normalized to be 2 with the entry cost
parameter fE. In all the analysis, we assume that the mean establishment size of the tradable
sector is as in the US.
In order to quantify the gains to trade reform in a dynamic environment, we need a model
that can generate reasonable establishment characteristics, including the entry and exit decisions of
both new and exporting establishments. For this reason, we target establishment size distributions
as well as dynamic moment of exporters and non-exporters. Similar to Bernard et al. (2003), we
target the 1992 US economy. We have 7 parameters, ρ, σε,μ E,λ ,f 0,f 1,and nd0 which we choose
to match the following 7 observations:
1. A exporter rate of 22.3 percent (1992 Census of Manufactures).
2. Exporter output premium (the average exporter shipments relative to the average non-exporter
shipments) of 5.6 as in Bernard et al. (2003) based on 1992 Census of Manufactures.
3. A stopper rate of 17 percent as in Bernard and Jensen (1999) based on the Longitudinal
Research Database (LRD) of the Bureau of the Census 1984-1992.
4. Entrants’ labor share of 1.5 percent reported in Davis et al. (1996) based on the Annual
Survey of Manufactures (ASM).
5. Shutdown establishments’ labor share of 2.3 percent (Davis et al. 1996).
6. Five-year exit rate of entrants of 37 percent based on plants that ﬁrst began producing (Dunne
et al. 1989).
7. Establishment employment size distributions (fractions of establishments and fractions of em-
21ployment given the employment sizes) as in the 1992 Census of Manufactures.
The ﬁrst three targets relate exporters to the population of establishments. As is well known,
not all establishments export. Those that do are much bigger than the average establishment. There
is also substantial churning in the export market, with the typical exporter exiting after six years
of exporting.
The next three targets help to pin down the establishment creation, destruction, and growth
process. New establishments and dying establishments tend to be small, respectively accounting for
only 1.5 percent and 2.3 percent of employment. Moreover, new establishments have high failure
rates, with a 37 percent chance of exiting in the ﬁrst ﬁve years.
Since the establishment employment size distributions cannot be perfectly matched given the
limited number of parameters, we use the following procedures. First, for a given value of σε we
choose the remaining six parameters to match the ﬁrst 6 moments. Then we compute the sum of
squared residuals from the data and the model’s implied distribution of establishment employment
size.15 Finally, we search for the value of σε that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.16 The
parameter values are reported in Table 1 and the ﬁt of the benchmark model, dubbed Sunk-Cost,
and some variations, is summarized in Table 2.
We also consider three other variations of the model to isolate the role of the structure of
ﬁxed costs and idiosyncratic technology shocks for exporter characteristics and aggregate results. In
the ﬁrst variation, which we call Fixed-Cost,w ec o n s t r a i nf0 = f1 so that the startup cost and the
continuation cost are identical. In this parameterization, the entry and exit thresholds are identical
and so there is no hysteresis. In our second variation, called Permanent,w es h u td o w nt h ev a r i a t i o n
15Speciﬁcally, we use the following 10 bins for employment sizes: 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499,
500-999, 1000-2499, and 2500 and more employees.
16The model is solved by discretizing the idiosyncratic shock process and then using value function iteration to solve
for the marginal starters and stoppers.
22in idiosyncratic shocks over time and instead assume that establishments draw their technology at
birth. With no plant-level uncertainty, we can only match either the employment share of entrants,
deaths, or the 5-year survival rate. We match the employment share of dying establishments. In our
third variation, we also calibrate an alternate model with no ﬁxed costs of exporting, which we call
the No-Cost model. To make this model comparable with the other three, we calibrate the trade
cost so that total trade ﬂows are the same as in our benchmark model with sunk costs.
A. Establishment Distribution
Our ﬁrst aim is to evaluate whether the model can explain both the rate of export partic-
ipation across plants and the churning in exporting. Our calibration strategy has been to target
the establishment and employment size distribution in manufacturing plus a limited set of mo-
ments about export participation, transitions, and the exporter premium. We ﬁnd that both the
benchmark model and the ﬁxed-cost model generate export participation rates by establishment
size similar to those in the data, but that the ﬁxed-cost model generates too much churning in the
export market. That the benchmark sunk-cost model generates the best ﬁt with the data is perhaps
not surprising, after all it is the most general of the models. Some sense of the beneﬁto fm o d e l l i n g
the diﬀerence between export startup and continuation costs is apparent in that our calibration
implies startup costs are 3.9 times continuation costs.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of births, exporters, and non-exporters by productivity level
for our benchmark model. We also plot the exit rate by productivity level along with the threshold
to enter and exit the export market. To match the low employment share of entrants and high exit
rate, mean new establishment productivity starts out about 33 percent lower than mean incumbent
productivity. The model generates a productivity threshold for entry that exceeds the productivity
threshold to exit by 63 percent (in logs). These thresholds imply a large range of exporter hysteresis
as the marginal non-exporter that starts to export will have 80 employees, while the marginal
23exporter that stops exporting has 7.2 employees in steady state.
The top two panels of Figure 2 plot our targets about the establishment and employment
distribution by employment size. The ﬁrst panel plots the share of establishments by employment
size. The share of establishments is decreasing in size in the data and all the models we consider.
The second panel plots the share of manufacturing employment accounted for by establishments
in each employment category in the data and the models. The distribution is hump-shaped, with
establishments with 100 to 249 employees accounting for almost 20 percent of total employment.
All four models can approximate this basic shape. However, not surprisingly since it is the most
general model, statistically the sunk-cost model provides the best ﬁt to the data.
The last panel of Figure 2 plots export participation in the data and the three models with a
decision to export. All three models have been calibrated to get the total participation rate correct
but no other information about the distribution of participation has been used. In all three models
export participation increases with establishment size, although more so than in the data. With
regards to the distrubution of exporter participation, the ﬁxed-cost model provides a slightly better
ﬁt than the sunk-cost model. However, the ﬁxed-cost model predicts substantially more churning in
the export market with exporters spending slightly less than 2 years exporting compared to the 5.9
year spells we see in the data. When shocks are permanent, the model substantially overpredicts
participation by big establishments and generates an exporter premium 3 times bigger than in the
data.
4. Tariﬀs and Steady State
To gain some insight into how tariﬀs distort economic activity, we now study how the struc-
ture of the steady state economy depends on tariﬀs. We ﬁrst explore the impact of tariﬀso nt h e
characteristics of exporters vs. non-exporters. We then consider the relation between tariﬀsa n d
aggregates such as consumption, investment, trade, and export participation. For exposition, all
24series are measured relative to the level under free trade.
A. Exporter Characteristics and Dynamics
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between exporter characteristics and tariﬀs ranging from 0
to 30 percent. Panel (a) shows that the productivity cutoﬀs of the marginal starter, z0, and the
marginal stopper, z1, are increasing in tariﬀs as the higher tariﬀ lowers the value of exporting.
Panel (b) plots the exporter output and productivity premia in the stationary distribution
of establishments against the tariﬀ rate.17 For low tariﬀs, the exporter productivity premium is
increasing with the tariﬀ rate. We get this monotonic relationship between tariﬀs and the exporter
productivity premium because the tariﬀ alters the type of establishments that export. As we
increase the tariﬀ, we increase the productivity cutoﬀs to start and stop exporting. Thus, the
average productivity of exporters increases relative to that of non-exporters. Unlike the exporter
productivity premium, the output premium is U-shaped in the tariﬀ rate. Absent tariﬀs, the output
premium is increasing in the productivity premium. However, holding the productivity premium
constant, the output premium is decreasing with tariﬀsa sh i g h e rt a r i ﬀs reduce exports of each
establishment. For tariﬀs less than about 4 percent, the direct eﬀect of tariﬀs on output dominates
the indirect eﬀect working through the productivity premium. For tariﬀs greater than 4 percent,
the eﬀect of tariﬀs on productivity dominates.
Panel (c) plots the equilibrium starter and stopper rates for each tariﬀ level. As tariﬀs
increase, we ﬁnd that non-exporters start exporting less frequently and establishments that do
export exit fairly frequently. The duration of exporting is inversely proportional to the stopper rate.
With 8 percent tariﬀs, the model predicts that each export spell lasts about 5.9 years. Under free
trade, the duration of each export spell rises to about 10.0 years.18
17The productivity premium is calculated as the diﬀerence between the average productivity of exporters and that
of non-exporters in logarithm.
18Since the plant-level productivity is persistent, the export spell is increasing in the plant-level productivity.
25Panel (d) plots the share of establishments in the tradable sector that are exporters. Moving
from 8 percent tariﬀs to free trade increases export participation from 22.3 percent of the estab-
lishments to 41.3 percent as the thresholds to start and stop exporting are lowered. Similarly, as
we increase tariﬀsa b o v e8 percent, exporters exit foreign markets in droves. To get an idea of the
importance of the exit margin for participation, we have also plotted the export participation rate
that would have prevailed if we had held the exit threshold constant at the level with 8 percent
tariﬀs. This partial equilibrium counterfactual implies that modelling the exit margin just about
doubles the sensitivity of exporting to tariﬀs.19
B. Aggregates
We start our analysis of the aggregate eﬀect of tariﬀs by considering trade-related variables.
To highlight the role of ﬁx e de x p o r tc o s t s ,w ea l s or e p o r tt h er e s u l t so ft h eNo-Cost model, which
is identical to our benchmark model except that there are no costs of exporting, f0 = f1 =0 .
We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of tariﬀs on establishment creation in each model. From panel
(a) of Figure 4, in No-Cost the mass of tradable establishments decreases with tariﬀs, while the
mass of non-tradable establishments is increasing in tariﬀs. Tariﬀsa r ee ﬀectively a tax on trad-
able establishments and thus the economy substitutes toward non-tradable establishments. In the
benchmark model, both tradable and non-tradable establishments are increasing in tariﬀs. However,
from panel (b) we see that the mass of diﬀerentiated varieties available, measured as imports and
domestic tradables, declines with tariﬀs as the increase in local tradable establishments is oﬀset by
a decline in foreign varieties as export participation declines with tariﬀs.
There are two reasons why increasing tariﬀs encourage establishment creation. First, tariﬀs
raise the relative price of physical capital to establishments or export capacity, as physical capital
19Of course this understates the role of the exit margin, since it is the exit margin that determines the duration of
exporting. A longer expected duration of exporting raises the expected value of exporting and increases entry.
26is produced using labor, capital, and materials, while establishments and export capacity are pro-
duced just using labor whose price, the real wage rate, is decreasing in tariﬀs (panel e). Second,
tariﬀs lower the beneﬁts of investing in export capacity. When the tariﬀ is raised, the return to
producing additional varieties of goods by incurring the cost of exporting is reduced. We see that
tariﬀs encourage savings through investment in establishments rather than capital (panel f), while
discouraging saving through export capacity. Moving from free trade to 30 percent tariﬀsi n c r e a s e s
the mass of tradable varieties by about 7.4 percent. However, the net eﬀect is to decrease the mass
of available varieties by about 22 percent. Thus, tariﬀs encourage establishment creation20 over
capital accumulation and discourage investing in export capacity.
Panel (c) shows that the relationship between the nominal trade to GDP ratio and tariﬀsi s
about twice as strong in the Sunk-Cost model compared to the No-Cost model. For instance, going
from 30 percent tariﬀs to free trade raises trade from 0.6 percent to 8.6 percent in the Sunk-Cost
model, while in the No-Cost model the increase is about half as big, from 1.9 to 6.8.
Despite the stronger trade response in the Sunk-Cost model, we see from panel (d) that
lowering tariﬀs increases steady state consumption by more in the No-Cost model. For low tariﬀs, the
gap between the two models is not too large and the No-Cost model provides a good approximation
of the change in steady state consumption from a change tariﬀsi nt h eSunk-Cost model. For larger
tariﬀs, the No-Cost model substantially overstates the change in steady state consumption from
eliminating tariﬀs.
That tariﬀs distort steady state consumption by more in the model without export decisions
may appear surprising. After all, the literature has emphasized that the gains to lowering trade
barriers should be larger in models with export decisions, since the lower barriers attract more
relatively productive exporters. We actually view this result as being sensible. In the model with
20The pro-variety of tariﬀs is also found in the work by Baldwin and Forslid (2006).
27an export decision, tariﬀs are a tax on exporting and so the economy invests less in exporting but
more in producing tradable varieties. In the No-Cost model, tariﬀs are a tax on the entire tradable
sector and so it leads to fewer tradable establishments. In a sense, the model with a ﬁxed cost has
one additional margin with which to adjust and hence the impact on steady state consumption is
smaller.
Now, a question arises: Are the welfare gains with transition dynamics similar to the steady
state comparisons? To assess the costs or beneﬁts of reducing tariﬀs carefully, it is necessary to
consider the transition dynamics.
5. Transition Dynamics
In this section, we consider a move from a world in which both countries charge 8 percent
tariﬀs to free trade. The results from this policy experiment provide some guide to the expected
changes in the US and the rest of the world from moving to free trade. This change in policy is
assumed to be completely unanticipated.21 The long-run changes in the model economy are reported
in Table 3 and the ﬁrst 50 periods22 of the transition 23 are plotted in Figures 5 and 6. We begin
by discussing the aggregate implications and then consider the implications for the volume of trade
and exporting.
21This distinction is quite important in the sunk-cost model, since an anticipated trade reform will generate a change
in trade prior to the reform since the increase in the expected value of continuing to export will lead some relatively
unproductive exporters to not exit.
22The evolution of the establishment distribution and the use of capital in production give rise to a slow transition
to the new steady state. The most intesting dynamics are in the ﬁrst 50 years.
23With the ﬁxed costs, a large change in policy can give rise to oscillations as a large mass of establishments can be
c r e a t e di nap a r t i c u l a rp e r i o d .T or e d u c e the oscillatory behavior with high frequency in the establishment creation
during the transitions, we introduce small adjustment cost, which depends on the mass of new establishments relative
to that of incumbents, rather than a constant cost. The modiﬁed costs of creating a new variety in the tradable and












respectively. Here, a is the steady state level of establishment destruction rate, NTE/NT = NNE/NN,a n dκ is set to
10. With this variation, the maximum variation of costs is about 0.7 percent during the entire transitions suggeting
the modiﬁcation has only negligible eﬀects on the results.
28A. Welfare
From the last row of Table 3, which reports the change in welfare24 taking into account the
transition to the new steady state, we see, as expected, that the gains to lowering tariﬀsa r ea b o u t
1/3 larger in our model of exporting than in the No-Cost model (1.24 vs 0.90). In our benchmark
model, steady consumption understates the true welfare gain of trade reform by 14 percent (1.07 vs
1.22). In contrast, in the No-Cost model steady state consumption overstates the true welfare gain
by approximately 37 percent.
The transition to the new steady state in the No-Cost model shows the familiar gradual
expansion in economic activity common to the neoclassical growth model. With lower tariﬀs, the
price of tradables and physical capital both fall so that more tradable establishments are created and
more capital is accumulated. The investment in capital and establishments is ﬁnanced by foregone
consumption along the transition and so steady state consumption overstates the true welfare gain.
In the benchmark model, a trade liberalization leads to a sustained economic expansion
that overshoots the new steady state along the transition. From panel (a) of Figure 5 we see that
consumption grows quite strongly following the cut in tariﬀs, peaking 0.3 percent above the new
steady state 10 years after the policy change. This overshooting is somewhat surprising given the
strong consumption smoothing motive in the model, and largely reﬂects the economy’s ability to
better use existing assets, namely establishments, along the transition. This improved eﬃciency is
captured in the dynamics of the Solow residual25 in panel (c). By this measure, following a trade
liberalization there are both permanent and persistent changes in total factor productivity. As with
a persistent productivity shock in a standard real business cycle model, agents take advantage of
this shock by investing in capital accumulation (panel b) and smoothing out consumption, and this
24For a reference, in the model of Alvarez and Lucas (2006), the US gains 0.15 percent of consumption from a global
elimination of tariﬀs.
25The Solow residual is constructed as z =l nD − 0.34lnK − 0.66lnL.
29is what leads to the overshooting in consumption.
Unlike total factor productivity in a real business cycle model, the change in total factor
productivity in our model is endogenous and reﬂects changes in the number of establishments and
exporters, as well as in the productivity distribution of establishments. In the previous section we
showed that tariﬀs lead to an overaccumulation of establishments and underaccumulation of ex-
porters compared to free trade. Along the transition there are many establishments that can easily
be converted into exporters. Thus along the transition the economy will invest less in establishments
and invest more in creating exporters. The net eﬀect is a rapid increase in the number of tradable
varieties available, which also overshoots its long-run level (panel f). Because this expansion in
variety occurs through an increase in exporters and decrease in the creation of establishments, the
distribution of productivity over plants is also changing over time. Since entrants are generally less
productive than incumbents, the decline in entry reduces the mass of relatively unproductive estab-
lishments, thereby raising the average productivity, measured as a simple average, of the existing
establishments (panel d). This measure peaks 0.3 percent above its initial and long-run levels26 in
year 4.
B. Trade and Exporters
The four panels of Figure 6 plot the evolution of trade-related variables along the transition
to the new steady state. Starting with the trade to GDP ratio (panel a), we see that in both the
Sunk-Cost and No-Cost models trade expands substantially with tariﬀ reductions. In the No-Cost
model, the trade share jumps by 42.1 percent to its new long-run level right away since the trade-
GDP ratio is determined by the tariﬀ rate and transportation costs. In the Sunk-Cost model, the
trade expansion is much more drawn out. In the ﬁrst period trade increases by 44.1 percent since
26Given that exit and productivity evolve exogenously, the distribution of establishments over productivity is iden-
tical across all steady states of the model.
30existing varieties become less expensive. In the second period, trade expands another 21.5 percent
as export participation increases. From then on, trade grows more gradually to its long-run value,
which exceeds the initial level by 81.9 percent.
The gradual increase in trade reﬂects a slightly more gradual increase in export participation
(panel b). On impact, export participation rises by 34.1 percent. In the next period it expands
another 18.8 percent. From then on export participation grows gradually another 32.1 percent to
its long-run level, which is greater than the initial level by 85.1 percent. The increase in exporting
occurs through a persistent increase in the starter ratio and persistent decrease in the stopper ratio,
both of which overshoot their long-run levels (panel c). From panel (d) we see that very little of the
overshooting of the stopper and starter rates results in overshooting in the entry and exit thresholds,
but instead reﬂects the fact that when the policy is enacted there are many relatively productive non-
exporters at the margin and very few unproductive exporters. Given the large gap between the entry
and exit threshold, this implies that along the transition, the mass of exporters clustered around the
upper threshold is quite large relative to the steady state. So, just as the establishment distribution
was shifted toward relatively more productive establishments, the exporter distribution is shifted
toward relatively productive establishments. The change in exporter distribution contributes to the
overshooting in economic activity.
6. Sensitivity
To make the model consistent with the data, we embedded a number of real-world features
into our benchmark model, Sunk-Cost, that the theoretical literature on international trade com-
monly abstracts from.27 We now investigate the quantitative implications of these abstractions on
the relation between tariﬀs, trade, and welfare. In doing so, we highlight the key margins that
27Some papers using versions of the Melitz model to study diﬀerent issues related to international trade include
Ruhl (2003), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2005), Chaney (2005), Gibson (2006) and Baldwin and Forslid (2006).
31matter in the model.
Speciﬁcally, we consider 4 variations of our benchmark model. In addition to the Permanent
and Fixed-Cost model we already described, we include a model with no capital, called No-Capital,
and another model in which tradable producers do not use intermediate goods, called No-Materials.
The parameter values used for these variations are reported in Table 1. The calibration targets
and the ﬁt of the models are reported in Table 2. With these variations, we consider the eﬀect of
eliminating a tariﬀ rate of 8 percent. The long-run eﬀects are reported in Table 3 and transitions
of some key variables are plotted in Figure 7.
Capital accumulation is important primarily for the welfare results. Abstracting from capital
accumulation lowers the welfare gain to moving to free trade by about one-quarter but has no
noticeable impact on either export participation or trade ﬂows. Without capital, the timing of the
expansion following the trade liberalization is a bit diﬀerent too, with the economy expanding more
early on, with output peaking 6 years earlier and 23 percent below the peak in the benchmark
model. The more drawn-out expansion in the benchmark model results from capital being useful
to smooth out consumption, while the larger long-run gains with capital point to the beneﬁts of
capital being complementary to exporting.
From the Fixed-Cost variation, we see that the structure of ﬁxed costs matters for both the
trade and export participation response to tariﬀs but less so for welfare. When the startup cost
is the same as the continuation cost of exporting, the trade and export participation increase is,
respectively, 12 and 38 percent less than in the benchmark model. The alternate model generates a
smaller response of trade and exporting because the threshold for entry and exit is identical and there
are fewer establishments aﬀected by changes in this threshold than in the benchmark model. With
ﬁxed costs, export capacity is no longer a durable asset and hence increasing export participation
uses up more resources along the transition, while in the sunk-cost model the economy can use
32existing exporters more eﬀectively. These exporter dynamics imply less overshooting following trade
liberalization and smaller welfare gains in the Fixed-Cost variation.
Eliminating the establishment idiosyncratic uncertainty reduces both the welfare gain and
trade response to trade reform. With permanent shocks, the distribution of productivity over es-
tablishments is unaﬀected by the rate of new establishment creation. Thus, there is no overshooting
and consumption grows much more gradually to its new steady state, and steady state consumption
overstates the welfare gain. Additionally, now export participation and trade rise only 33 percent
and 62 percent, respectively, as much as in the Sunk-Cost model.
Without intermediates, the welfare gains to trade reform are about 22 percent of our bench-
mark model. Yi (2003) also found that intermediates magniﬁed the welfare costs of tariﬀs. Tariﬀs
are more distortionary with materials because it is as if certain goods cross the border multiple times.
However, the trade response is nearly identical to the Sunk-Cost model without intermediates.28
7. Conclusions
We have studied the ability of the Melitz model to account for diﬀerences in US export
participation among manufacturing establishments as well as the churning in exporting. We found
that a model with plant-level uncertainty and ﬁxed costs of starting to export 3.9 times as big as the
cost of continuing in the export market matches up well with the distribution of export participation
among US manufacturing plants. We then used the model to calculate the increase in trade and the
gains to moving to free trade. They are both sizeable.
We ﬁnd that tariﬀsh a v eas m a l l e re ﬀect on steady state consumption in the Melitz model
28Yi (2003) develops a model of trade in which intermediates move back and forth across borders in diﬀerent stages
of production and endogenizes the number of times goods cross the border. In some respects, there is some of this
back and forth in our model in that when establishments choose to export they are selling goods overseas which then
will be reimported in the goods of intermediates of foreign exporters. Adding materials does not magnify this eﬀect
because in our model all of the changes come in the ﬁrst stage of production with the change in range of varieties
available.
33than in models without ﬁxed costs of exporting, even though tariﬀs lower trade by more in the
Melitz model. These paradoxical steady state results are sensible once one realizes that models
without ﬁxed costs of exporting are special cases of models with ﬁxed costs and therefore have fewer
margins on which to adjust. However, we also note that steady state consumption is not a good
measure of welfare in either model, particularly when there is a large sunk component to exporting.
The model with ﬁxed costs of exporting predicts that lowering tariﬀs should spur a substantial
economic expansion that overshoots the new steady state after about 10 years. These transition
dynamics imply that the welfare gains to trade reform are larger than measures based on steady
state consumption. The structure of ﬁxed export costs and idiosyncratic shocks determines the
magnitude of the overshooting. When we shut down plant-level uncertainty and assume export
costs are not sunk, the economy does not overshoot its new steady state.
The model was used to provide some guidance on the key margins that matter for trade
and welfare in models with establishment heterogeneity. If one is mostly interested in trade ﬂows,
we ﬁnd that models without sunk costs substantially understate the long-run increases in trade,
since increases in export participation are much smaller. We also found that the dynamics of trade
growth are more gradual in models with sunk costs. In terms of welfare, we found an important
quantitative role for both capital and intermediate inputs in the production process of tradables.
We have studied only symmetric trade policies with two symmetric economies. However,
the model is well suited to considering the impact of unilateral reforms as well. In particular, we
can consider the impact on both net exports and the real exchange rate of a unilateral change in
trade policies. One would expect that unilaterally lowering tariﬀs would generate somewhat larger
economic expansions along the transitions to the new steady state as the reforming country can
borrow to ﬁnance greater investment. We are currently exploring this topic.
34Table 1: Parameter Values
Common Parameters
β =0 .96,σ=2 ,θ=5 ,δ=0 .10,τ=0 .08
Benchmark (Sunk-Cost)
α =0 .289,λ=7 .460,n d0 =0 .022,α m =0 .804,γ=0 .21,ξ=0 .451,
ρ =0 .625,μ E =0 .352,σ ε =0 .355,f E =1 .641,f 0 =0 .101,f 1 =0 .026
No-Cost
α =0 .285,λ=7 .800,n d0 =0 .022,α m =0 .804,γ=0 .21,ξ=0 .662,
ρ =0 .625,μ E =0 .371,σ ε =0 .370,f E =1 .676,f 0 = f1 =0
No-Cost-No-Entry
α =0 .087,λ=0 ,n d0 =0 ,α m =0 .804,γ=0 .21,ξ=0 .662,
ρ =0 .625,μ E =0 ,σ ε =0 .355,f E →∞ ,f 0 = f1 =0
Fixed-Cost
α =0 .296,λ=7 .527,n d0 =0 .022,α m =0 .804,γ=0 .21,ξ=0 .451,
ρ =0 .520,μ E =0 .362,σ ε =0 .395,f E =1 .644,f 0 = f1 =0 .037
Permanent
α =0 .223,λ=0 ,n d0 =0 .023,α m =0 .804,γ=0 .21,ξ=0 .584,
ρ =1 ,μ E =0 ,σ ε =0 .440,f E =3 .177,f 0 = f1 =0 .015
No-Capital
α =0 ,λ=7 .460,n d0 =0 .022,α m =0 .804,γ=0 .21,ξ=0 .451,
ρ =0 .625,μ E =0 .352,σ ε =0 .355,f E =1 .247,f 0 =0 .077,f 1 =0 .020
No-Materials
α =0 .306,λ=7 .460,n d0 =0 .022,α m =0 ,γ=0 .581,ξ=0 .451,
ρ =0 .625,μ E =0 .352,σ ε =0 .355,f E =1 .187,f 0 =0 .073,f 1 =0 .019
35Table 2: Target Moments
Target Sunk- No- Fixed- Permanent No- No-
value Cost Cost Cost Capital Materials
5-year exit rate 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.11 0.37 0.37
Startups’ labor share 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.015
Shutdowns’ labor share 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Output Premium 5.60 5.60 - 5.60 18.28 5.60 5.60
Stopper rate 0.17 0.17 - 0.52 0.018 0.17 0.17
Exporter ratio 0.223 0.223 - 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223
Trade Share 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
Squared sum of residuals (%)
Establishments 0 0.84 3.70 2.31 2.58 0.84 0.84
Employment share 0 1.98 4.22 3.54 4.96 1.98 1.98
Export participation 0 33.45 - 28.16 87.21 33.45 33.45
36Table 3: Percent Changes in Steady State and Transition Changes from Eliminating 8% Tariﬀ
Sunk- No- Fixed- Permanent No- No-
Cost Cost Cost Capital Materials
Consumption 1.07 1.24 1.13 1.09 0.74 0.03
Trade to GDP ratio 81.89 40.09 71.67 50.39 81.89 79.78
Capital stock 1.35 1.51 1.40 1.35 - 0.49
Production labor -0.30 -0.12 -0.26 -0.12 -0.22 -0.17
Non-tradable variety -0.52 -0.35 -0.49 -0.35 -0.45 -0.55
Domestic tradable variety -1.88 1.48 -0.94 0.84 -1.81 -3.04
Total tradable variety 13.35 1.48 8.59 5.98 13.43 12.01
Starter ratio 67.87 - 49.16 62.43 67.87 67.87
Stopper ratio -41.27 - -19.19 39.31 -41.27 -41.27
Exporter ratio 85.11 - 52.74 27.81 85.11 85.11
Output premium -0.82 - 4.45 3.38 -0.82 -0.82
Productivity premium -10.33 - -5.16 -3.50 -10.33 -10.33
Static welfare gains 1.07 1.24 1.13 1.09 0.74 0.03
Transitional welfare gains 1.22 0.90 1.16 0.89 0.94 0.26
Note: Welfare gains are measured as the value of x that satisﬁes
P∞
t=0 βtU (C−1 (1 + x)) =
P∞
t=0 βtU (Ct),
where C−1 is the initial steady state consumption.
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39Figure 3: Steady State Establishment Characteristics and Tariﬀs











































































































































































40Figure 4: Steady State Aggregates and Tariﬀs





































































































































































































































41Figure 5: Transition Dynamics from 8 percent Tariﬀ to Free Trade


















































































































































































42Figure 6: Transition Dynamics from 8 percent Tariﬀ to Free Trade









































































































































Note: The average productivity is normalized with the steady state distribution to have zero-mean and unit-
variance.
43Figure 7: Transitions with Variations
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